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APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Come now the appellants respectively named in
the above entitled causes and petition the Court for a
rehearing in said cases and each of them.
Your petitioners respectfully represent that the
Court in its Opinion erred in the following particulars:

1. In failing to consider on the facts in these cases
the issue as to the constitutionality of Section 80-5-57,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, if such statute is construed
as permitting the inclusion of premium payments in computing net annual proceeds.
2. In holding that there was "no substantial difference between the present cases and those earlier decided
by us,'' and in effect holding the decisions in such cases
to be controlling here.
3. In failing to consider Section 81-1-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, in view of the admitted facts in these
cases that premiums were paid after a sale of ores upon
quotas established subsequent thereto.
4. In failing to give effect to the fact presented in
these cases that premium payments were continued
after ceiling prices on metals were removed and that
petitioners at such times reported to the Tax Commission the amount received upon the open market and not,
as the Court states, the ceiling price.
5. In failing to follow the elementary rule of
statutory construction that where ambiguity as to tax

liability exists, the doubt should be resolved in favor of
the taxpayer.
'VHF~RJ<JFORJ:i~

appellants pra.v that this petition
be granted and that upon rehearing the decision of this
Court heretofore made and entered be vacated and the
judgments of the Lower Courts be reversed.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR REHEARING
In the face of a unanimous decision, to petition any
court for a rehearing is doubtless comparable to
"tapping the deck of a troop ship with your cane
to stop the engines when you are seasick."
Nevertheless, for the reasons above enumerated and hereinafter considered, we feel under a duty, not only to our
clients but to the Court, to so petition:
Not only is it true (and never more so than in this
day of changing ideas and when established institutions
are under question) that as Judge Wolfe has written
"The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants
may have the highest confidence in the integrity
and fairness of the Courts.''

It is equally true that confidence in the thoroughness and
impartiality of the Courts must be preserved to insure
respect for their decisions.
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I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER ON
THE FACTS IN THESE CASES THE ISSUE AS TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 80-5-57 U. C. A. 1943,
IF SUCH STAT UTE IS CONSTRUED AS PERMITTING THE
INCLUSION OF PREMIUM PAYMENTS IN COMPUTING
NET ANNUAL PROCEEDS.

This Honorable Court in its opinion makes no reference to the most basic issue in the net proceeds cases,
namely, the constitutionality of the statute if that statute
is to be construed as permitting the inclusion of premium
payments.
As we pointed out in our original brief (pages 42 to
46), and as is clear beyond question upon the record presented in the present cases, subsidies are the exact opposite of net proceeds. They represent not what a mine is
capable of earning, but what in addition to earnings is
necessary to be expended for the continued operation of
amme.
Our statute defines value a.s the amount at which property would be taken in payment of a just debt from a
solvent debtor.
The Constitution requires equality of taxation.
To say that a mine would be taken in payment of
a just debt from a solvent 'debtor at a value arrived at

by including premium payments as net proceeds is to
say what every man with any familiarity with the facts

Ln c \'.'f'. 1o hr erroneous.
Surely this Honorable Court does not by its silence
wish to be understood m;

rc~;arding

the constitutional

right of the hundreds of stockholders in Utah mines to
equality of tax treatment with other taxpayers a.s undeserving of it.s consideration.
Surely also this Honorable Court does not assume
that such stockholders are ignorant of the fact that as
costs increase, values diminish.
As the record here .shows, repeated and detailed applications to the Quota Committee were made by the
various a ppellant.s and quotas were fixed and revised
on the basis of costs, and the higher the costs the more
the premiums received to compensate.
While the constitutional provi.sion is applicable only
to the net proceeds cases and not to the occupation tax
cases, we respectfully submit that this Court should not
fail to consider it or fail to give its reasons for such decision as it may make upon it. The Haynes case involved
a record showing wholly different facts and therefore is
not applicable here.

II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS
"NO SUBSTANTIAL DIIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRES-

6
ENT CASES AND THOSE EARLIER DECIDED BY US", AND
IN EFFECT HOLDING THE DECISIONS IN SUCH CASES
TO BE CONTROLLING HERE.

In its opinion, this Honorable Court states that:
''We are unable to determine any new points
or questions now being advanced which were not
presented to us for consideration in the earlier
actions, with the possible exception of the fact
that the subsidies continued for some period after
the ceiling price on the metals was removed. This
one additional factor is not of controlling importance.''
And the Court states that:
"We have no desire to foreclose appellants
from presenting matters which were not litigated
in the previous cases. The only burden we place
on them is to establish that the matters presented
in these suits are essentially and substantially
different from those passed on in the previous
litigation."
Far from there being only one ''additional factor''
as the Court states, the present cases differ materially
from what are referred to as the ''earlier actions.''
The only matter in common between the present
cases and the earlier cases is that they both involve the
inclusion of subsidy payments in computing the occupation tax and the net proceeds valuation of mines for purposes of the general property tax.

In the cases previously considered by this Court,
quotas were based upon mine production in 1941; ''premiums" were paid on account of excess production over
production in Hl41. Quotas were not tied to current costs
of production; were not adjusted to take account of retroactive costs; subsidies were not paid on the ba.;;is of a
quota revised and established after sale of ores.
In the occupation tax cases, this Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Wade based its decision specifically
on original Rule 13 which was .subsequently rescinded,
and upon specific facts in the records of the cases then
before it as distinguished from what might have been
in other cases then not before the Court. The Court itself
adopted this line of reasoning.
In the net proceeds cases, this Court based its deci.sion on the specific facts which it found from the record in those cases that premiums were only paid on a
sale of ores or when the ores had been converted into
the equivalent of money. But in the present cases the
records do not permit of holding that any ores have been
converted into the equivalent of money, the allegations
being specifically to the contrary. Therefore if in the
present net proceeds cases it is to be held that the premium.s are includible in computing net proceeds, it must
be found as a fact that they were paid only on a sale of
the ores, since there was no conversion of the ores into
the equivalent of money. But likewise the subsidies here
were not based upon sales either!
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We do not understand the court's comment to the
effect that amended Rule 13 "was the foundation for
many of the arguments of appellants in the previous
ca.ses"; those cases were submitted upon a stipulation
of facts which did not contain amended Rule 13. (We
may add that the stipulation did not contain such
amended rule because counsel were not aware at the time
the stipulation was entered into that original Rule 13
had been rescinded.)
In contrast with the earlier cases, here in summary
are the factors presently before this Honorable Court
for consideration:
No question of the conversion of ores into the
equivalent of money is involved. Con.sequently with relevance it 'cannot be said, as the Court nevertheless now
does, that the language in the Haynes case "broadened
the scope of the former as the later decision holds that
for 'net proceeds tax' purposes there need not be a sale
of the metals to include the subsidy payment in the tax
ba:.se.''
1.

It is specifically alleged in the present net proceeds
cases that there was no conversion of the ores into the
equivalent of money.
2. Quotas are tied neither to a prior year's production nor to ceiling prices. On the contrary, they are tied
to costs of production and are revised upwards or downwards as experience demonstrated to be requisite to in'.sure continued production. They were revised retroactively and premiums were paid on the basis of quotas

!)

established after a sale of ores and pursuant to a discretionary act of the Quota Committee; such payments
obviously were nothing which the company was even
legally entitled to receive at the time the ores were sold
but depended upon the subsequent action of the Quota
Committee.
3. Premiums were paid after all controls and ceiling pricea were removed and in such instances the
amounts received on the open market for ores sold were
reported to the State Tax Commission as the amounts
received on sales.
4. Neither in the act of Congress authorizing the
payment of premiums, nor in any regulation applicable
to the present cases is there a single word indicating an
intention that the payment of premiums shall be conditioned upon or deemed to be a part :of the moneys received on, a sale of ores, the basis of the earlier occupation tax case decision of this Court. On the contrary, the
relevant regulations expressly provide for payment of
premiums when excess production has been determined.

III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER SECTION 81-1-1 U. C. A. 1943 IN VIEW OF THE ADMITTED
FACTS IN THESE CASES THAT PREMIUMS WERE PAID
AFTER A SALE OF ORES UPON QUOTAS ESTABLISHED
SUBSEQUENT THERETO.

Unless Section 81-1-1 of our Code, setting forth the
common definition of a sale, is to be utterly disregarded

-----------------------------------
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(and this Honorable Court in its opinion makes no reference to it), then in order to hold that premiums were
received on a" .sale of ores", and therefore were properly
includible under the Legislature's language in computing
the occupation tax and net proceeds valuation, it must
be found that they were received "on account of a transfer of the property in the goods to the buyer.'' This is
the Legislature's language.
Under the allegations in some of the complaints now
before this Court, and which for present purposes must
be accepted as true, certain premiums were paid on the
ba.sis of quotas fixed after a sale of the ores.
The Quota Committee had discretion in rev1smg
quotas; it did revise quotas to take account of retroactive
labor costs, and to compensate for increased costs over
those on which quotas had originally been fixed.
We respectfully submit that it is a logical impossibility to assert that something to which a person had
no right at the time of a sale of ores still was received
by him on account of a transfer of the property in the
goods to the buyer.
All premiums were paid pursuant to the same Federal authority. When it appears that some premiums
were paid under these facts, it must be difficult to
believe that premiums were part of what was received on
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a ";sale of ores." This is the Legislature's wording, not
ours.

IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE EFFECT
TO THE FACT PRESENTED IN THESE CASES THAT PREMIUM PAYMENTS WERE CONTINUED AFTER CEILING
PRICES ENDED.

In its opinion this Honorable Court says that the
one fact presented in the present cases, additional to
those presented in the earlier cases, is that subsidies
continued for some period after the ceiling price on the
metals was removed. And the Court ;states "this one
additional factor is not of controlling importance."
As we have endeavored to point out, this one factor
is far from being the only additional factor. Certainly
it is of much less importance than the further additional
fact that subsidies in some cases were paid on quotas
established after a sale of ores. Al;so the fact that subsidies continued independent of prices was called to the
Court's attention on rehearing, but the Court stood by
the original decision on the basis of the records in those

cases.
Neverthless, we submit that it i;s not a fact which
should be disregarded without explanation:
As this Honorable Court states in the earlier cases,
subsidies were tied to ceiling prices, and in those cases
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relying upon original Rule 13 the Court held that the
''premiums'' plus the ceiling price represented the purchase price of the ores.
We now have a sale of ores on the open market, and
the payment of subsidies based upon quotas tied to determined costs of production. These subsidies are not
tied in to either ceiling prices or to a previous year's
production.
To hold that the .subsidies under such facts are received "on a sale of the ores", we submit, requires that
we disregard Section 81-1-1 as well as the obvious realities. If such an argument is "tenuous", after all it arises
and is based upon the very distinction made by the majority opinion in the Combined Metals Case. If, a.s is now
suggested, that difference is not of substance, since the
Court's original argument was tenuous, then it would
seem indeed that the earlier decisions are injudicious
and should be frankly overruled.
These differences and distinctions are not ours.

v.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE
ELEMENTARY RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
THAT WHERE AMBIGUITY AS TO TAX LIABILITY
EXISTS, THE DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR
OF THE TAXPAYER.

In an attempt to view this whole matter from our
position as officers of the Court and not mere advocates
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of our clients' cause, we can follow the predicament of
the present court up to the point where on page 5 of
its opinion the basis of the majority in the Combined
Metals Case is really abandoned and the views of Mr.
Justice Wolfe are before the Court. The problem then
indeed becomes that of either overruling the former
decisions, or sustaining sweeping tax liability upon Justice Wolfe's theory.
Your Honors then unanimously state, as did only
Mr. Justice Wolfe in his Combined Metals Case opinion:
''a good case could be made for including a premium payment in the tax base and conversely ()
a good case could be made for excluding the payments."
What, then, is the guide to show the Court which of these
two possibilities it should

follow~

The beacon that, as

a rule of law, should be known to Bench and Bar alike
in lighting our paths. The facts are not in dispute. It
is a question of statutory construction to determine the
intent-the "legislative mind"-of Utah's legislature
when in 1937 and before it enacted the law3 now facing
Utah's citizens and the Bench and Bar.
The rule applicable, it would seem, is one of long
standing and based upon sound reasons of policy. It
might be termed elementary, having been expounded
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long ago by this Court in common with the judiciary
and text-writers for generations without dissent.
We need turn only to Mr. Justice \Volfe's masterly
opinion in Norville v. State Tax Commission,

~)8

Utah

170, 97 P. 2d 937, where it is stated:
''The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in
case of doubt as to the intention of the legislature,
to be construed strictly against the taxing authority and in favor of those on whom the tax is levied,
has been well set out in the case of Helvering v.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct.
50, 79 L. Ed. 211. See, also Los Angeles & S. L.
R. Co. v. Richards, 52 Utah 1, 172 P. 474; W. F.
Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90
Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629, 107 A.L.R. 261; 25 R. C. L.
Sec. 307 at p. 1092; Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 11,
4th Ed. Sec. 503 at p. 1113."
Section 27 of Article 1 of our State Constitution
states:
''Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights
and the perpetuity of free government."
There has been no more fundamental principle m
our system of jurisprudence and public law than that
tax statutes should be construed strictly in favor of the
taxpayers. In Utah, starting with the case of Kerr v.

Woolley, 3 Utah 456, 24 P. 831, decided in 1866, there has
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been no rule better recognized by an unbroken Hne of
decisions through and including the Norville case, supra.
"Now, it is an established rule that all statutory modes of executing any laws, or any power
under a law, must be strictly pursued: A. D. M.
Turnpike Company v. Guild, 6 Mass. 44; Franklin
Glass Co. v. White, 14 Id. 286; 3 U. S. Dig. 43,
sec. 30.

* * * *
"The supreme court of the United States has
decided, Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black
436, upon this question of taxation and kindred
ones, that the rule of construction is against the
corporation and in favor of the public, and neither
the right of taxation nor any other power of
sovereignty will be held to have been surrendered
unless such surrender has been expressed in term.s
too plain to be mistaken.
"To the same effect are Billings v. The Providence Railroad Bank, 4 Vet. 561 ; Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 I d. 420; Girden v.
The Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; The Richmond Railroad Company v. The Louisiana Railroad Co., 13 Vet. 71; and many other cases of
the highest authority, all of which enjoin a strict
construction and execution of all such powers.
"It is wholly unnecessary to multiply citations as to the strict construction of the power
in question and the class to which it belongs. But
for this rule of strictness, the remedies in all such
cases might at last come to depend upon the mere
caprice of parties, in the unbridled discretion
of the .courts." Kerr vs. Woolley, supra.
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For other recent statements of this basic rule, we cite:
Howard, Gould, Plff. in Er-r., v. Katharine C. Gould,
245 U. S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53, 62 L. Ed. 211:
"In the interpretation of statutes levying
taxes it is the established rule not to extend their
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their
operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed mo.st strongly against the government, and
in favor of the citizen. * • * ''
Edison California Stores v. McColgan, (Calif.) Jan.
17, 1947, 176 P. 2d 697:

" * * * courts, in interpreting statutes levying taxes, may not extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language
used, nor enlarge upon their operation so as to
embrace matters not specifically included. In case
of doubt, construction is to favor the taxpayer
rather than the government. * * * "
And see 51 Am. Jur. "Taxation" Sec. 316.
It is respectfully submitted that right here is the

underlying and inherent error of thi.s entire subsidy
series of decisions to date. If such is the case, it would
still seem to be the duty of this Court-despite any embarrassment from overruling prior decisions which Federal Courts have had to follow-to choose that "possi-
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bility" which the law of statutory construction points
out as proper.
True, the decisions as they now stand create liability
for more taxes to be paid the State of Utah by a wellnigh prostrate industry. But to allude to the old Greek
legend-if the State of Utah is to win this race-after
the Tax Commission itself conceded it in the early years
by following this basic rule of construction-will the
torch of justice under the law in the hands of the winner
·still be alighU
Resp$tfully submitted,
A.M. CHENEY,
G. A. MARR,
C. W. WILKINS,
PAUL B. 'CANNON,
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Mining Company.
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C. E. HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Park Utah Consolidated Mines Company.
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Attorney for Silver King Coalition Mines Company.
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WM. M. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper
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